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I. INTRODUCTION
The basic telecommunications' industry comprises a vast portion
of the world's economy.2 People from different nations increasingly
use this means to communicate with one another. 3 In an effort to
foster international telecommunications, fifty-five governments, 4 un-
1. See John H. Harwood et al., Competition in International Telecomnumica-
lions Services, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 874, 875 n.3 (1997) (defining basic telecom-
munications service as "the unmodified transmission of voice or other basic data").
Harwood describes the enormous wireline network necessary to provide basic tele-
communications services. See id. at 880. In many nations one entity has created a
monopoly controlling the facilities that provide these basic telecommunications
services. See id.; see also ROBERT R. BRUCE ET AL., FROM TELECOMMUNICATIONS
TO ELECTRONIC SERVICES 175 (1986) (describing the enormous expense of con-
structing another privately owned wireline system and the resulting economic inef-
ficiencies if such an investment were made).
Wireless mobile services, otherwise known as personal communication service
or radio common carrier service, also provide basic telecommunications service.
See Harwood et al., supra, at 876 n.36. These wireless services, however, are not
adequate substitutes for the traditional wireline service. See id. (noting that wireless
services cannot match the low price and higher quality of wireline service).
2. See Laura B. Sherman, Introductory Note to the Fourth Protocol to the
General Agreement on Trade in Services, 36 I.L.M. 354, 354 (1997); see also
Rules and Policies on Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecommunications Mar-
ket (visited Nov. 25, 1997) (statement of William E. Kennard, FCC Chairman)
<http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Kennard/Statements/stwek705.html> [hereinafter
Kennard Statement] (stating that there is a $600 billion global basic telecommuni-
cations market).
3. See generally Kennard Statement, supra note 2 (setting forth Kennard's ex-
pectations that increased competition will bring about greater access to telecommu-
nication services around the world).
4. See Agreement on Telecommunications Services, April 30, 1996, Attach-
ment to Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services, WTO
Doc. S/L/20, 36 I.L.M. 354, 373-74 (1997) (listing the governments that are sig-
natories to the Fourth Protocol as: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia,
Bangladesh, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile,
Colombia, C6te d'Ivoire, Czech Republic, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecua-
dor, El Salvador, European Communities and their Member States, Ghana, Gre-
nada, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia. Israel, Jamaica,
Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Sene-
1346 [13:1345
1998] GLOBAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPETITION A R&Aun 1347
der the auspices of the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), negoti-
ated the historic Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade
in Services ("Fourth Protocol").5 The Fourth Protocol was closed for
participation on February 15, 1997.6
The Fourth Protocol advocates granting Most Favored Nation
("MFN") treatment to other WTO Members regarding entry regula-
tions that address participation in the Member's basic telecommuni-
cations market.7 To participate in the Fourth Protocol, a WTO Mem-
ber must substantially alter its existing approach to the delivery of
basic telecommunications service. 8 WTO Members and their citizens
are expected to gain substantial benefits from these changes. Origi-
nally, participants were required to comply with the Fourth Proto-
col's commitments by January 1, 1998.10 Delays by a few partici-
pants in implementing the Fourth Protocol postponed the effective
gal, Singapore, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand,
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, the United States of America, and Vene-
zuela).
5. Agreement on Telecommunications Services. April 30. 1996, Fourth Proto-
col To The General Agreement on Trade In Services. WTO Doc. S/20; 36 I.L.M.
354, 366 (1997) [hereinafter Fourth Protocol].
6. See Harwood et al., supra note 1, at 880-84 (describing the lengthy and ar-
duous negotiations leading up to the Fourth Protocol).
7. See Sherman, supra note 2. at 354 (establishing that sixty-nine countries
agreed to allow market access to all or some of their basic telecommunications
services).
8. See generally Harwood et al., supra note 1, at 881 n.36 (describing the mo-
nopolies that are prevalent in the delivery of basic telecommunications service
around the world). But see id. at 881 n.37 (describing the competition that exists or
is slated to begin in certain basic telecommunications services in Australia, Canada,
Chile, El Salvador, the European Union, Japan, Mexico, and Singapore).
9. See, e.g., In re Rules and Policies on Foreign Participation in the U.S. Tele-
communications Market, Market Entry and Regulation of Foreign-Affiliated Enti-
ties, lB Docket Nos. 97-142, 95-22, FCC No. 97-398 (Nov. 25. 1997), available in
1997 WL 735476, para. 4 [hereinafter 1997 Foreign Entry Order] (describing the
Federal Communication Commission's ("FCC") interpretation of the effects that
the Fourth Protocol will have on global competition, namely "'tangible benefits to
U.S. consumers, U.S. companies, and the world at large"). See also Erik W.
Schmidt, Note, Intenzational Telecommunications Transactions: A Critique of the
FCC's "Effective Competitive Opportunities" Analysis, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INr'L
L. 629, 629 (1997) (stating that the United States' telecommunications industry
desperately needs capital from foreign sources while the European telecommunica-
tions industry, for example, could benefit from American managerial skills).
10. See Fourth Protocol, supra note 5, para. 3 (stating that the Fourth Protocol
shall enter into force on January 1, 1998).
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date to February 5, 1998.11 Fourth Protocol signatories whose law is
not in accord with the Fourth Protocol by the new implementation
date have until July 31, 1998 to comply.' 2 The United States is one of
the nations that was prepared to meet the Fourth Protocol's commit-
ments on January 1, 1998.13
The United States, through the Federal Communications Commis-
sion ("FCC"), radically changed its regulation of basic telecommuni-
cations services with the promulgation of the 1997 Foreign Entry Or-
der.' 4 This order greatly streamlines the entry procedures that basic
telecommunications providers from nations that are part of the WTO
11. See WTO Telecoms Deal Will Ring in the Changes on 5 February 1998,
WTO Doc. PRESS/87 (Jan. 26, 1998) [hereinafter WTO Telecom Releasel (re-
porting February 5, 1998 as the implementation date of the Fourth Protocol); WTO
Sets Feb. 5 Date for Trade Agreement, TR INT'L, Jan. 30, 1998, available in 1998
WL 9762352 (reporting that the WTO Members that complied with the Fourth
Protocol agreed to change the implementation date to February 5, 1998). Members
originally planned on January 1, 1998 as the implementation date. See id.
12. See Telephony, COMM. DAILY, Jan. 28, 1998, available in 1998 WL
2495270 (stating that thirteen Fourth Protocol participants require the extra time to
achieve the necessary modifications to comply with the Fourth Protocol). The thir-
teen nations that have not implemented new laws include Argentina, Belgium, Bo-
livia, Brazil, Chile, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Papua
New Guinea, the Philippines, Poland, and Romania. See id.
13. See 1997 Foreign Entry Order, supra note 9, para. 12 (stating that the
United States, with the 1997 Foreign Entry Order and the International Satellite
Service Order, has met its commitments under the Fourth Protocol and expects the
entry of foreign carriers in the United States market "soon after January I, 1998").
But cf In re Telecom New Zealand Ltd., 13 F.C.C.R. 363, 364 para. 3 (1998)
(stating that the FCC will continue to apply the effective competition opportunity
("ECO") test until its rules are amended); infra pt. III.A.2 (discussing the ECO
test); FCC Prepares For a More Open Global Telecommunications Market,
COMM. TODAY, Jan. 12, 1998, available in 1998 WL 5264340 (stating that it is the
goal of the United States to have its rules on foreign market participation in the
telecommunications market go into effect by February I, 1998).
The 1997 Foreign Entry Order initiated the transformation of United States'
regulation of foreign entry, but until the Final Rules were published in the Federal
Register, the FCC did not apply the regulatory framework contained in the 1997
Foreign Entry Order. See Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecommunications
Market, 63 Fed. Reg. 5743 (1998) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 43, 63 & 64)
(stating that the regulations contained in the 1997 Foreign Entry Order were effec-
tive without modification as of February 9, 1998).
14. See generally 1997 Foreign Entry Order, supra note 9; Kennard Statement,
supra note 2 (describing how the old regulatory regime of foreign market partici-
pation with regard to WTO Member nations is now completely replaced by the
1997 Foreign Entry Order).
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face when entering the United States market.' 5 Drawing from the
goals of the landmark Telecommunications Act of 1996,16 the 1997
Foreign Entry Order attempts to encourage competition in the United
States telecommunications industry by making it easier for a foreign
entity to participate in the American basic telecommunications mar-
ket.' 7 Affected industry participants and WTO Members have mixed
reactions to the order.
18
The European Union has expressed concern that the 1997 Foreign
Entry Order does not reconcile American law with the United States'
commitments under the Fourth Protocol.' 9 As a result, the European
15. See 1997 Foreign Entry Order, supra note 9. para. 21 (adopting a schedule
of regulatory review that responds to foreign entry requests within sixty days);
Kennard Statement, supra note 2 (describing the new entry process for foreign par-
ticipants as greatly streamlined); Commission Liberalizes Foreign Participation in
the U.S. Telecommunications Market (visited Nov. 26, 1997) <http://wwwv.fcc.gov/
Bureaus/International/NewsReleases/I 997/nrin7O42.html> (stating that foreign
participation in the United States telecommunications market will be easier with the
enactment of the 1997 Foreign Entry Order).
16. Telecommunications Act of 1996. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Star. 56 (to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 151) (stating that Congress enacted the Act to promote
competition in the telecommunications industry, reduce regulation of the industry,
enhance service for American consumers, and promote developing technology in
the industry).
17. See 1997 Foreign Entry Order, supra note 9, para. 2 (describing increased
competition, lower prices, and greater options for consumers as some of the bene-
fits that will result from the relaxation of the rules allowing foreign participation in
the United States' telecommunications market).
18. See EU Urges US to Change Telecoins Rules, EU Release No. 54/97 (Aug
5, 1997) [hereinafter EU Release] (stating the European Commission's concerns
with the 1997 Foreign Entry Order, while welcoming the FCC's removal of the
ECO test); FCC Adopts Rules for Easier Access to U.S. Market. Claims Conpli-
ance with U.S. Coymnitments in WTO Pact, TELECOMM. REP., Dec. 1, 1997. avail-
able in 1997 WL 7759218 [hereinafter FCC Adopts Rules fir Easier Access to
U.S. Market] (describing AT&T Corporation's concerns about portions of the 1997
Foreign Entry Order regarding foreign telecommunications resellers who may try' to
lower rates below cost and engage in a price squeeze strategy).
19. See VTO Wanzing to Washington Over Teleconnunications Licenses,
EUR. REP., Sept. 3, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13046329 (describing the outrage
expressed by the European Commission at the 1997 Foreign Entry Order when the
order was a proposal); EU Release, supra note 18; see also 1997 Foreign Entry
Order, supra note 9, para. 353 (acknowledging the European Commission's con-
tention that the 1997 Foreign Entry Order is the FCC's means of retaining power to
deny access to the United States' telecommunications market to prospective foreign
participants).
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Union has threatened to lodge a complaint before the WTO. 2" Al-
though the European Union's threats have not resulted in a formal
proceeding, 2 1 they raise concerns that the implementation of the 1997
Foreign Entry Order may not fulfill the United States' commitment
22
to the Fourth Protocol.
Part II of this Comment focuses on the United States' commit-
ments under the Fourth Protocol and examines how the Fourth Pro-
tocol changes the competitive landscape of the basic telecommunica-
tions industry. Part III describes the development in United States
law on foreign participation in its basic telecommunications industry.
Part IV reconciles the 1997 Foreign Entry Order with the Fourth
Protocol and argues that the 1997 Foreign Entry Order complies with
20. See infra pt. V (describing the European Union's issues with the 1997 For-
eign Entry Order): see also General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
IB, 33 I.L.M. 1167, 1182-83, arts. XXII & XXIII [hereinafter GATS] (setting
forth the dispute resolution mechanisms available to a WTO Member). See gener-
ally C. O'Neal Taylor, The Limits of Economic Power: Section 301 and the World
Trade Organization Dispute Settlement System, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 209,
250-59 (1997) (outlining the dispute settlement system of the WTO); Charles M.
Oliver, WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services and FCC Imple-
mentation, 15 CoMM. LAW. 13, 14-15 (1998) (detailing the sequence of proceed-
ings that would be necessary for a WTO dispute under the GATS); ERNST-ULRICH
PETERSMANN, THE GATTiWTO DIsPuTE SEITLEMENT SYSTEM: INTERNATIONAL
LAW, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND DIsPUTE SETTLEMENT 212 (1997)
(discussing the differences between the GATT dispute resolution systems and the
GATS dispute resolution systems). Cf Rodrigo Bustamante, Note, The Needfor a
GATT Doctrine of Locus Standi: Why the United States Cannot Stand the Euro-
pean Conlmunit v 's Banana Import Regime, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 533, 553
n. 109 (1997) (describing procedural steps that are followed upon the initiation of a
GATT dispute).
21. See FCC Adopts Rules for Easier Access to U.S. Market, Claims Compli-
ance with U.S. Commitments in WTO Pact, supra note 18 (confirming that the
European Commission has retained the option to seek redress in a WTO proceed-
ing regarding the 1997 Foreign Entry Order).
22. See Schedule of Specific Commitments of the United States of America,
WTO Doc. GATS/SC/90/Suppl.2 (Apr. 11, 1997) [hereinafter Final United States
Commitments] (detailing the exact commitments the United States must meet in
opening its basic telecommunications industry); List of Article H (MFN) Exemp-
tions of the United States of America, WTO Doc. GATS/EL/90/Suppl.2 (Apr. 1I,
1997) [hereinafter Final United States Exemptions] (listing the exceptions to the
Fourth Protocol made by the United States); see also Harwood et al., supra note 1,
at 883-84 (stating that the substance of the Fourth Protocol is comprised of the
commitments and exclusions that make up a WTO Member's overall obligation to
the Fourth Protocol and ultimately the GATS).
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the market opening mandates of the Fourth Protocol. Part V evalu-
ates the European Union's possible claims against the 1997 Foreign
Entry Order, and Part VI concludes that the European Union should
refrain from initiating action until the 1997 Foreign Entry Order has
been tested by actual practice.
II. FOURTH PROTOCOL ON BASIC
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
A. THE NEGOTIATIONS
At the conclusion of the Marrakesh Round of trade negotiations
that established the General Agreement on Trade in Services
("GATS"), 23 participants agreed to negotiate a protocol that ad-
dressed basic telecommunications service.24 Key GATS participants
were concerned that their markets would be harmed by immediately
granting MFN status to all WTO Members. 5 MFN treatment would
require WTO Members with open markets to grant all other WTO
Members access to their markets on a non-discriminatory basis even
if those other Members do not maintain open markets.2 Without any
additional agreement, the WTO Member with the open market would
be unable to leverage another WTO Member to open its market.
27
23. See generally GATS, supra note 20.
24. See id. at 1196 (requiring that negotiations commence on incorporating ba-
sic telecommunications into the GATS while, in the meantime, exempting basic
telecommunications from the MFN provisions of the GATS).
25. See Sherman, supra note 2. at 355 (describing the free rider problem that
could result from granting MFN treatment in the basic telecommunications service
sector without any further agreement).
26. See id. at 367 (citing GATS art. II and describing the MFN requirement of
the GATS that does not allow a WTO Member to discriminate among other Mlem-
bers when applying its basic telecommunications regulations); (:f Kenneth Frei-
berg, Introductory Note to the Second Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade
in Services, 35 I.L.M. 199, 199-200 (1996) (explaining that the United States'
relatively open market in financial services could be a disadvantage to the United
States market if MFN were immediately applied because other WTO Members
would enjoy participation in the open United States market and not have to open
their market to the United States; and noting that essentially the same MFN argu-
ment holds true for the basic telecommunications market).
27. See Freiberg, supra note 26, at 200 n.9 (arguing that the GATS MFN rule
would prevent WTO Members with relatively open markets in a particular service
sector from discriminating against individual WTO Members, and that members
would not likely deny access to all WTO Members. which is permissible under the
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Due to its outspoken concerns, 28 the United States led the negotia-
tions by offering market-opening policies in its basic telecommuni-
cations market.
29
As the deadline for conclusion of an agreement on basic telecom-
munications neared,30 the United States brought more offers of mar-
ket reforms to the negotiating table.3 1 As the talks continued among
WTO Members, many countries either improved their previous
GATS, just to legally discriminate against individual WTO Members); see also
GATS, supra note 20, art. XX (allowing WTO Members to specify exceptions to
commitments of the GATS and any side agreements by requiring Members to an-
nex schedules of commitments and exceptions to the GATS).
28. See Harwood et al., supra note 1, at 882-83 (describing the demands made
by the United States during the early stages of negotiation resulting from a belief
that the MFN commitments of other WTO Members were "meaningless" because
of its own more open market); Erik Krauland et al., International Legal Develop-
inents in Review: 1996 Business Regulation: International Trade, 31 INT'L LAW.
433, 437-38 (1997) (describing the United States' concerns that foreign basic tele-
communications monopolies will use their market power to harm competition when
providing international telecommunications service).
29. See Sherman, supra note 2, at 358 (citing WTO Doc. No.
S/NGBTIW/12/Add.3) (describing the first offer by the United States, made in July
of 1995, that included all basic telecommunications services except local telephone
service, placed limitations on foreign ownership of undersea cables, and restricted
access to satellite systems); see also Report of the Negotiating Group on Basic
Telecommunications, WTO Doc. S/NGBT/18, (Apr. 30, 1996); 36 I.L.M. 362,
362-63 (1997) [hereinafter 1996 NGBT Report] (describing the negotiation proc-
ess of the WTO as a series of offers by Members that are progressively enhanced
through the negotiation process among the Members that results in specific com-
mitments that must be annexed to the GATS or else the Members' offers will be
rescinded).
30. See Decision on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications, Ministerial
Decisions and Declarations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Dec.
15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 136, 144-45 (1994) (setting the deadline for concluding the
negotiations of a basic telecommunications agreement as April 30, 1996); see also
Decision on Commitments in Basic Telecommunications, WTO Doc. S/L/20, para.
3 (Apr. 30, 1996), 36 I.L.M. 365 (1997) [hereinafter Decision on Basic Telecom-
munications] (allowing any WTO Member to change a submitted annex to the
Fourth Protocol or, if the Member has not already done so, submit an annex to the
Fourth Protocol during the period of time between January 15, 1996 and February
15, 1997); Harwood et al., supra note 1, at 882-83 (describing the withdrawal of
the United States from the negotiating table before the April 30, 1996 deadline that
caused the WTO to extend the deadline for participation in the Fourth Protocol to
February 15, 1997).
31. See Sherman, supra note 2, at 358-59 (describing the incrementally more
open offers of market access that the United States presented to the negotiation
between July of 1995 and November of 1996).
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commitments to the Fourth Protocol or, for those who had not previ-
ously made any commitments (including the United States), 2 sched-
uled commitments for the first time.33 These commitment proposals
culminated when the United States offered to completely open its ba-
sic telecommunications service market to all WTO Members.
4
As a result, the GATS will now encompass the basic telecommu-
nications service industry for those WTO Members that have made
commitments under the Fourth Protocol.35 The level of Fourth Proto-
col commitments varies from Member to Member.ib In an attempt to
create common regulatory systems among WTO Members, however,
32. See Harwood et al., supra note 1. at 882 (discussing the United States'
withdrawal from participation in the Fourth Protocol before the first April 30. 1996
deadline).
33. See id. at 883 (describing the continuing negotiating period under the aus-
pices of the WTO).
34. See Sherman, supra note 2, at 359 (describing the final offer of the United
States to completely open the United States market to competition by foreign fa-
cilities-based carriers or resellers of basic telecommunications service regardless of
the technology used, permitting limited direct ownership of United States basic
telecommunications carriers by foreign entities, and allowing complete indirect
ownership of United States basic telecommunications providers by foreign enti-
ties). But see id. (describing the United States' exception to MFN for certain satel-
lite transmissions of broadcast services and digital audio services); Final United
States Exemptions, supra note 21 (listing the final exceptions to the Fourth Proto-
col that were filed with the WTO).
35. See Fourth Protocol, supra note 5. para. I (incorporating each WTO Mem-
ber's commitments and exceptions to the Fourth Protocol into that Member's
commitments and exceptions to the GATS); see also Harwood et al., supra note 1,
at 884 (noting that once a WTO Member has made a commitment to the Fourth
Protocol, it has made a binding commitment, and therefore, the Fourth Protocol
represents a permanent opening of the international basic telecommunications mar-
ket).
36. See WTO Telecom Release. supra note I I (describing the levels of com-
mitment of WTO Members to the Fourth Protocol by surveying each Member's
commitment to discrete basic telecommunications services); Harwvood et al., supra
note 1, at 883-84 (describing the varying levels of commitment but emphasizing
that the overall result of the Fourth Protocol is to open a substantial portion of the
global basic telecommunications industry). See, e.g., id. at n.48 (citing Mark Lan-
dler, Conununications Pact to Favor Growing Giants, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1997,
at B 1) (describing the exceptions to the Fourth Protocol announced by Canada and
Japan)); Final United States Evemptions, supra note 22 (listing the United States'
exceptions to the Fourth Protocol).
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the WTO promulgated a Reference Paper 37 that suggested the form
of basic telecommunications regulation and highlighted conduct that
would warrant regulation.38 Although the Reference Paper is not an
official WTO document, 39 the fact that fifty-five countries have
adopted it as part of their commitments to the Fourth Protocol indi-
cates its critical importance.
40
B. THE REFERENCE PAPER
The Reference Paper provides a roadmap by which a WTO Mem-
ber can fully comply with the Fourth Protocol.4 1 The Reference Paper
also defines the types of anti-competitive behavior against which a
WTO Member must guard.42 Examples of the anti-competitive be-
havior described in the Reference Paper include: exploitation of "es-
sential facilities" by a "major supplier,, 43 cross-subsidization of af-
37. See Reference Paper to the Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on
Trade in Services, 36 I.L.M. 367 (1997) [hereinafter Reference Paper]: see also
infra pt. II.B. (analyzing the Reference Paper).
38. See 1996 NGBT Report, supra note 29, at 362-63 (reporting on the compi-
lation of a Reference Paper to guide WTO Members when implementing the mar-
ket opening commitments in their countries). See generally Harwood et al., supra
note 1, at 884 (discussing the Reference Paper's suggested regulatory approach and
scope).
39. See 1996 NGBT Report, supra note 29, at 363 (stating that the Reference
Paper is an informal document).
40. See Sherman, supra note 2, at 357 n.23. The countries that adopted the Ref-
erence Paper were: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brunei, Bulgaria, Can-
ada, Chile, Colombia, C6te d'Ivoire, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Do-
minican Republic, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece,
Grenada, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, It-
aly, Jamaica, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway. Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Senegal,
Singapore, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland,
Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Vene-
zuela. See id. Countries are distinguished from governments by the WTO-for ex-
ample, the EU is one government comprised of fifteen countries.
41. See generally Reference Paper, supra note 37 (describing the Reference
Paper as merely a tool to define the regulatory principles for basic telecommunica-
tions services).
42. See id. at 367.
43. See id. (defining "essential facilities" as a public telecommunications net-
work, either wire-based or radio-based). The Reference Paper further explains that
the exploitation of an essential facility can occur when a single entity or a group of
entities supplies the essential facility and there is no economically-feasible substi-
tute for the essential facility. See id. It also defines a major supplier as one that has
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filiates, 44 and misapplication of proprietary information. 45 In addi-
tion, the Reference Paper describes the type of regulation that a WTO
Member should adopt to address this behavior.46
The Reference Paper suggests the creation of an independent
regulatory agency in each WTO Member nation to ensure certain
market conditions.47 These suggested regulatory agencies should en-
sure interconnection 48 so that any telecommunications service pro-
vider can have access to a WTO Member's basic telecommunications
market. 49 Furthermore, they should promulgate public licensing stan-
dards so that a prospective market participant will know how to gain
either a monopoly in the essential service or market power in the provision of the
essential service. See id; see also supra note 1 (describing the prevalence of mo-
nopolies in the basic telecommunications service industry); c. iifra note 103 (de-
scribing the United States antitrust law's interpretation of "essential element" and
the harm that can result from the exploitation of control of such an element).
44. See Reference Paper, supra note 37, at 367 (stating that cross-subsidization
is anti-competitive behavior). See generally Douglas B. McFadden, Antitrust and
Conununications: Changes After the Telecommunications Act (of 1996, 49 FED.
COM. L.J. 457, 466-67 (1997) (describing the harmful competitive effects that oc-
cur when a telecommunications provider with monopoly power in one market seg-
ment uses its monopoly profits to subsidize its business activities in another market
segment that is competitive).
45. See Reference Paper, supra note 37, at 367 (listing improper use of pro-
prietary information by a competitor).
46. Cf Oliver, supra note 20, at 14 (stating that the Reference Paper provides a
synopsis of the regulatory regime promulgated by the 1996 Telecommunications
Act that completely altered the United States' regulation of its telecommunications
industry).
47. See Reference Paper, supra note 37. at 369 (requiring the proposed regu-
lator be separate and independent from suppliers of basic telecommunications
services).
48. See generally CHARLES H. KENNEDY & M. VERONICA PASTOR, AN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS L \W 26 (1996) (de-
scribing interconnection as the process by which a telecommunications provider
attaches its equipment to an existing wireline network).
49. See Reference Paper, supra note 37, at 368 (requiring that a major supplier
offer interconnection to other telecommunications service providers under the same
conditions as the major supplier enjoys, thereby ensuring the same quality at a rea-
sonable price and at the appropriate network termination points). The Reference
Paper also requires that the negotiation of interconnection agreements involving a
major supplier be made by terms that are publicly available. See id. Finally, it re-
quires that an independent regulatory body in the WTO Member state resolve dis-
putes arising from interconnection issues. See id.
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access to the market. 50 Finally, the WTO Member nation should
charge the agencies with preventing anti-competitive behavior
prevalent in the basic telecommunications market.5 '
III. UNITED STATES LAW ON FOREIGN
PARTICIPATION
A. THE 1995 FOREIGN ENTRY ORDER
Prior to the announcement of the 1997 Foreign Entry Order, the
FCC regulated the participation of foreign telecommunications pro-
viders through its previous order, In re Market Entry and Regulation
of Foreign-Affiliated Entities ("1995 Foreign Entry Order"). 52 The
FCC applied an "effective competition" 53 opportunity ("ECO")
analysis 54 to satisfy its statutory public interest review of prospective
foreign telecommunications service providers' participation in the
United States market.55 The FCC crafted the ECO analysis and other
50. See id. at 368-69 (requiring that a WTO Member's independent regulatory
body provide standards for determining licensing decisions and a time frame for
reaching these decisions).
51. See id. at 367 (stating that WTO Members should take "appropriate meas-
ures" to combat anti-competitive behavior); Harwood et. al, supra note 1, at 884
(stating that the suggested regulatory body should also prevent anti-competitive be-
havior); supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (describing anti-competitive be-
havior prevalent in the basic telecommunications industry); see also Harwood et
al., supra note 1, at 884 (citing Carter Dougherty, U.S. Officials Say Delay Pro-
duced Better WTO Telecom Agreement, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Feb. 18, 1997, at S-3)
(stating that the United States particularly desired that an independent regulatory
body combat telecommunications providers' anti-competitive behavior because
such conduct would undermine the whole effect of the Fourth Protocol).
52. In re Market Entry and Regulation of Foreign-Affiliated Entities, II
F.C.C.R. 3873 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Foreign Entry Order].
53. See id. at 3875, para. I (defining "effective competition" as a condition
where competition exists among telecommunications carriers that create innovative
technology, lower prices, and increase consumer choice for service).
54. See id. at 3875-76, para. 2 (adopting the ECO test for all applications of
foreign entities before the FCC pursuant to Sections 214 and 31 0(b)(4) of title 47
of the United States Code); Schmidt, supra note 9, at 630-31 (outlining the appli-
cants that are subject to the ECO test).
55. See 47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (1994) (requiring the FCC to review any new tele-
communications service that crosses state lines to ensure that the "present or future
public convenience and necessity require or will require the construction, or opera-
tion, or construction and operation, of such additional [service]"); 47 U.S.C. §
310(b)(4) (1994) (limiting the foreign ownership and/or control of a domestic
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safeguards to promote the specific goal of enhancing competition in
international telecommunications service.
56
1. The Goals of the 1995 Foreign Entry Order
The FCC primarily endeavors to enhance global competition in
telecommunications service.: The agency has always maintained
that competition benefits all interested parties-consumers, provid-
ers, and regulators.58 Increased competition in telecommunications
service inherently promotes the FCC's public interest mandates59 and
ultimately its overall mission.
60
Preventing anti-competitive behavior in the provision of interna-
tional telecommunications service was another goal of the 1995 For-
eign Entry Order. 61 The FCC observed that foreign telecommunica-
tions providers with market power in their home market had the
ability to distort the market for international telecommunications
service in the American market. 62 Therefore, the FCC concluded that
regulating the United States market was the sole means of addressing
potential anti-competitive conduct.63
common carrier to one-fourth of the capital stock of the common carrier and limit-
ing the number of foreign directors on the common carrier's board of directors to
one fourth the total number of directors if the FCC "finds that the public interest
will be served by the refusal or revocation of such license").
56. See 1995 Foreign Entry Order, supra note 52, at 3877, para. 6 (setting forth
the FCC's goals in regulating the United States international telecommunications
market).
57. See id. at 3877, para. 8 (clarifying previous FCC statements that curbing
anti-competitive behavior was merely one of three goals to promote competition).
58. See id. at 3878, para. 9 (finding that increased competition lowers prices for
consumers and reduces the need for burdensome regulation that, in turn, saves the
resources of regulated businesses and the regulatory body).
59. See supra note 55 (detailing the public interest mandates the FCC must
protect).
60. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994) (creating the FCC to "make available.., to all
the people of the United States... a rapid, efficient, nation-wide, and world-wide
wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable
charges"); 1995 Foreign Entry Order, supra note 52. at 3878, para. 10 (citing 47
U.S.C. § 151).
61. See 1995 Foreign Entry Order, supra note 52, at 3875-76, par. 2.
62. See id. at 3879-80, paras. 13-14 (detailing the harmful practices that a for-
eign market participant with monopoly power in its home market can wreak on the
United States market).
63. See id. at 3879, para. 13 (stating that effective competition can only come
about through regulation of the telecommunications market due to the prevalence
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Finally, the FCC hoped to encourage foreign governments to open
their markets to outside competitors. 64 The FCC appreciated the ad-
vantages a foreign telecommunications carrier would enjoy if it had
access to the United States market.65 By subjecting the foreign tele-
communications carrier to the ECO test, the FCC ensured that a
United States carrier had the same opportunity to compete in the for-
eign market. 66 If such an opportunity did not exist, the foreign appli-
cant would be denied access or only granted conditional access to the
United States market.67 It was in the interest of the prospective for-
eign market participant to pressure its government to enact market-
opening policies and, thus, allow the participant to enter the United
States market. 68 The FCC repeatedly emphasized that it was not re-
quiring foreign governments to open their markets, but rather was
providing a strong incentive for the foreign governments to do so.
69
of market participants with market power); see also id. at 3878, para. 8 (clarifying
that the FCC is regulating the "U.S. international telecommunications services
market," which is within the FCC's jurisdiction); id. at 3957-64, paras. 223-38
(discussing the jurisdictional foundation by which the FCC may regulate the market
for international telecommunications service based upon the potential harm anti-
competitive forces can have on American consumers and telecommunications pro-
viders); supra note 55 (describing the public interest obligations charged to the
FCC). But see Schmidt, supra note 9, at 640-44 (arguing that the statutory grant of
jurisdiction by Congress to the FCC does not extend to regulation of foreign mar-
kets using coercive means such as the ECO test).
64. See 1995 Foreign Entry Order, supra note 52, at 3875-76, para. 2 (stating
that a goal of the FCC was to encourage other governments to eliminate barriers to
competition in telecommunications services).
65. See id. at 3886, paras. 32-33 (describing the benefits of participation in the
United States market by either foreign-facilities based carriers, foreign resellers, or
investment in domestic telecommunications providers by foreign telecommunica-
tions providers).
66. See infra pt. III.A.2 (analyzing the ECO test).
67. See 1995 Foreign Entry Order, supra note 52, at 3888, para. 36 (recogniz-
ing that if the ECO test found that there were few competitive opportunities for
American providers in a particular foreign market it is likely the FCC would either
limit or deny that foreign telecommunications provider's application to enter the
United States market).
68. See id. at 3886-87, paras. 32-34 (detailing the incentives that exist for for-
eign telecommunications carriers to lobby their governments to meet the standards
created by the ECO test); id. at 3945, para. 187 (stating that it is not "unfair to hold
foreign carriers accountable for the policies of their home governments").
69. See id. at 3887, para. 35 (stressing that the ultimate decision to change its
laws and regulations regarding foreign telecommunications competition lies in the
hands of the foreign government).
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2. The ECO Test
The FCC adopted the ECO test to promote international competi-
tion in the telecommunications industry. 70 The ECO test evaluates
the existence of competitive opportunities for a United States tele-
communications provider in the home country of the prospective for-
eign participant.7' The ECO analysis requires the evaluation of six
factors to determine whether effective competitive opportunities exist
for domestic market participants in the foreign market. 72 These fac-
tors encompass much of the scope of the public interest review per-
formed by the FCC.
7 3
Although the ECO test was the overwhelming criterion, failing or
satisfying the ECO test was not the end of the inquiry for an applica-
tion.74 For example, the FCC could determine that negative findings
70. See id. at 3881, para. 18 (stating that adopting the ECO test is the best
means to achieve fair global competition).
71. See Harwood et al., supra note 1, at 885 (describing the ECO test's ability
to detect competitive opportunities for American businesses in foreign countries).
72. See 1995 Foreign Entry Order, supra note 52, at 3889, para. 40. It lists the
six factors of an ECO analysis as:
1) whether U.S. carriers can offer in the foreign country international facilities-based
services substantially similar to those that the foreign carrier seeks to offer in the
United States; 2) whether competitive safeguards exist in the foreign country to protect
against anti-competitive and discriminatory practices... ; 3) the availability of pub-
lished, nondiscriminatory charges, terms and conditions for interconnection to foreign
domestic carriers' facilities for termination and origination of international services, 4)
timely and nondiscriminatory disclosure of technical information needed to use or in-
terconnect with carriers' facilities; 5) the protection of carrier and customer proprietary
information; and 6) whether an independent regulatory body with fair and transparent
procedures is established to enforce competitive safeguards.
Id.; see also Schmidt, supra note 9, at 632 (stating the four main factors in the
FCC's ECO analysis: whether there are actual barriers to entry into the foreign
market, whether reasonable opportunities for interconnection exist to the foreign
telecommunications network, whether there are competitive safeguards in the for-
eign market, and whether the foreign market is effectively regulated).
73. See 1995 Foreign Entry Order, supra note 52, at 3881, para. 18 (stating that
adopting the ECO test with additional safeguards serves the goals of increased
competition).
74. See id. at 3876, para. 3 (retaining the additional public interest considera-
tions outside the ECO test as the "general significance of the proposed entry to
promotion of competition in the U.S. communications services market, the pres-
ence of cost-based accounting rates (under Section 214). as well as national secu-
rity, law enforcement issues, foreign policy, and trade concerns"); Schmidt, supra
note 9, at 633 (stating that an ECO determination may be outweighed by other
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identified by the ECO analysis did not outweigh the benefits to
American consumers that would result from a foreign participant's
entry into the United States market.75 Those benefits would then
prompt the approval of the application. Furthermore, the FCC may
identify problems in its ECO analysis that would be addressed by
pending legislation in the foreign market participant's home coun-
76try. In this situation, the FCC may grant the application despite the
harms revealed by the ECO test.
77
Nevertheless, the ECO test was the primary regulatory test that the
FCC performed when reviewing applications of foreign market par-
ticipants that wished to enter the United States basic telecommunica-
tions market.7 8 The FCC designed the ECO test to protect the Ameri-
can market while at the same time giving foreign tele-
communications providers a framework under which they could
evaluate whether or not to pursue an application to enter the Ameri-
can market. 79 Despite the existence of the Fourth Protocol and the
public interest factors such as national security concerns and the likelihood of
competitive harms that the application poses).
75. See, e.g., Harwood et al., supra note 1, at 885 n.57 (describing the FCC's
action in approving an application despite the absence of effective competitive op-
portunities in the Netherlands for terrestrial microwave services because the exist-
ing public interest factors favoring approval, coupled with the regulatory changes
in the Netherlands, outweighed the negative ECO finding).
76. See, e.g., id. at 890 (describing the FCC's approval of an application that
raised ECO concerns on the condition that France and Germany approve market-
opening legislation).
77. See, e.g., In re Western Wireless Corp. and Western PCS Corp., 13
F.C.C.R. 64, 71 para. 20 (1997) (stating that even if there were ECO problems with
an application, Hong Kong's participation in the Fourth Protocol would likely
prompt the FCC to approve the application nevertheless); In re Telecom Finland
Ltd., 12 F.C.C.R. 17648, 17656-57 para. 24 (1997) (stating that Finland's partici-
pation in the Fourth Protocol would have likely overcome any ECO concerns). But
see In re The Merger of MCI Communications Corp. and British Telecomm. PLC,
12 F.C.C.R. 15351, 15356 para. 8 (1997) (stating that even if Britain were to im-
plement completely the Fourth Protocol at the time of the instant proceeding, that
alone would not warrant approval of the application).
78. See 1997 Foreign Entry Order, supra note 9, para. 22 (reviewing the appli-
cation of the ECO test beginning with its adoption in 1995 to all applications by
foreign market participants under 47 U.S.C. §§ 214 & 310(b)(4) (1994)).
79. See 1995 Foreign Entry Order, supra note 52, at 3890, para. 44 (responding
to foreign governments' concerns that the ECO test is ambiguous by stating that the
factors utilized in the ECO test actually provide "clear guidance" on the scope of
the FCC's analysis); see also discussion, supra note 72 (describing the factors of
the ECO analysis).
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1997 Foreign Entry Order, the FCC continues to apply the ECO test
to applications originating from nations not part of the WTO.O
3. Safeguards
The 1995 Foreign Entry Order contains safeguards to correct anti-
competitive harm that occurs after approval of an application."
These safeguards include the "no special concessions" requrement 2
and extensive reporting requirements for foreign service providers.81
The safeguards are intended to ensure that the applicant does not
80. See 1997 Foreign Entry Order, supra note 9. para. 15 (finding that appli-
cants from non-WTO countries will be subjected to the analysis created by the
1995 Foreign Entry Order, which includes the ECO test); FCC Declines to Open
Foreign Capital Floodgates Early, PCS WEEK. July 9. 1997. available in 1997
WL 7364431 (quoting FCC International Bureau Chief as stating: **Until the com-
mission adopts final rules to implement the WTO agreement. however_. e %%ill
continue to apply the current public interest analysis. : se also In re Telecom
New Zealand Ltd., 13 F.C.C.R. 363, 364 para. 3 (F.C.C. Jan. 7. 1998) (applying
the ECO test to an applicant from a WTO Member nation until the rules announced
in the 1997 Foreign Entry Order take effect): IiTO hnplenentatin Date Evapo-
rates; FCC Schedules Briefing on New Rules. TELECoMM. REP., Dec. 22. 1997,
available in 1997 WL 7759330 (describing the reason for the delayed iniplementa-
tion of the 1997 Foreign Entry Order due to the public regulatory review require-
ments mandated by United States law). But see Foreign Participation in the U.S.
Telecommunications Market. supra note 13, at 5743 (stating that the regulatory
scheme contained in the 1997 Foreign Entry Order is effective as of February 9,
1998).
81. See 1995 Foreign Entry' Order, supra note 52. at 3876. para. 5 (applying the
competitive safeguards to United States telecommunications carriers that are al-
ready affiliated with foreign telecommunications providers).
82. See id. at 3972, para. 258 (stating that any United States telecommunica-
tions carrier may not agree to accept a special concession from any foreign carrier
unless the foreign carrier does not have market po\%er in its home country, in which
case the FCC has the discretion to waive this requirement).
83. See id. at 3973-74, para. 262 (requiring that foreign-affiliated carriers that
have market power file a tariff change request at least fourteen days prior to ef-
fecting the change). The 1995 Foreign Entry Order requires a domestic telecom-
munications carrier with market power to file authorization requests when adding
or removing circuits. See id. at 3974-75, paras. 263-65. It also requires domestic
telecommunications carriers that have market power as a result of an affiliation
with a foreign carrier to file quarterly traffic and revenue reports. See id. at 3974-
75, para. 265. Finally, it requires that a foreign-affiliated telecommunications pro-
vider vith market power maintain detailed records related to the provision and
maintenance of its facilities and services that it purchases from the foreign pro% id-
ers for review upon request by the FCC. Set, it. at 39475. para. 266.
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have the opportunity to exploit its market power in its home market
to the detriment of American consumers or service providers.
84
B. THE 1997 FOREIGN ENTRY ORDER
On November 25, 1997, seeking to bring United States law into
accord with the Fourth Protocol and to pass on the benefits of in-
creased competition in basic telecommunications services to Ameri-
can consumers, 85 the FCC announced the 1997 Foreign Entry Or-
der.86 To meet the obligations imposed by the Fourth Protocol, the
1997 Foreign Entry Order replaces the ECO test with an open entry
standard that presumes that the entry of foreign market participants
from WTO nations does not threaten competition. 87 To ensure
American consumers the benefits of increased competition, the 1997
Foreign Entry Order preserves the public interest review as a back-
stop to prevent any anti-competitive behavior by a prospective for-
eign market participant.
88
1. An Open Entry Standard for WTO Members Replaces ECO Test
Perhaps the most significant change in the FCC's regulation of
foreign participation is the removal of the ECO test for applicants
84. See id. at 3880, para. 15 (stating that the purpose and function of competi-
tive safeguards is to protect against practices that are harmful to competition and
consumers).
85. See 1997 Foreign Entry Order, supra note 9, para. 2 (surveying the change
in international law brought about by the Fourth Protocol, the need to change
United States law in response to the Fourth Protocol, and the belief that increased
competition will benefit American consumers).
86. See id.
87. See id. para. 9.
88. See 1997 Foreign Entry Order, supra note 9, para. 46 (stating that notwith-
standing the Fourth Protocol, the FCC must still "ensure that all applications are
consistent with the public interest"); infra pt. III.B.2 (analyzing the public interest
standard); supra note 55 and accompanying text (describing the statutory responsi-
bility of the FCC); see also 1997 Foreign Entry Order, supra note 9, paras. 13-14
(defining the prospective foreign market participant that benefits from the rules as
one that files (i) an application for permission to provide international basic tele-
communication service using its own facilities or by reselling private wireline
service, (ii) an application for a cable landing license into the United States, or (iii)
an application for authorization to exceed the 25% threshold of foreign ownership
permitted by existing law).
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from WTO nations.89 The FCC designed the open entry standard that
replaces the ECO test to give prospective foreign market participants
from WTO Member nations a relatively unobstructed path into the
United States market.90 Most importantly, this new standard pre-
sumes that the prospective foreign market participant is from a nation
that will open its market to foreign participation, especially to
United States basic telecommunications providers. - Although some
WTO Members have not fully committed to completely opening their
markets to competition, 93 and others are currently phasing in their
commitments to open competition,94 the open entry standard applies
regardless of the degree of commitment made by individual WTO
Members to the Fourth Protocol.95 The FCC does not require that a
89. See 1997 Foreign Entry Order, supra note 9, para. 9; see also id. para. 10
(noting the benefits that American consumers will enjoy when foreign market par-
ticipants are allowed to participate in the American market more liberally). The
FCC maintains that the elimination of the ECO test will substantially reduce pro-
spective foreign market participants' regulatory burden. See id. para. 30. To sup-
port its position, the FCC cites industry comments that argue that abandoning the
ECO test will save valuable time and resources of the FCC and other interested
parties. See id. para. 31.
90. Compare 1997 Foreign Entry Order, supra note 9, paras. 33-34 (describing
the remaining regulatory issues facing a prospective foreign market participant and
the significant reduction in time and expense caused by removal of the ECO test)
with 1995 Foreign Entry Order, supra note 52, at 3891-95, paras. 47-56 (describ-
ing the detailed analysis required when applying the ECO test), and In re Telecom
New Zealand Ltd., No. 13 F.C.C.R. 363 (1998) (applying the burdensome ECO
analysis to a prospective foreign market participant's application).
91. See 1997 Foreign Entry Order, supra note 9, para. 9 (finding that the com-
mitments made by VTO Members to the Fourth Protocol will cause them to open
their markets and enact pro-competitive foreign participation regulations).
92. See id. paras. 4, 9 (noting that American basic telecommunications provid-
ers will benefit from more open markets that will result from the Fourth Protocol
and the enactment of the 1997 Foreign Entry Order); see also U.S. IndustrY Praises
Definite Date for WTO Pact, TR DAILY, Jan. 26. 1998. available in 1998 WL
6571113 (reporting the high praise that MCI Telecommunications Corporation and
AT&T Corporation have heaped upon the Fourth Protocol).
93. See 1997 Foreign Entry Order, supra note 9, para. 36 (citing industry con-
cerns that some WTO Members have not fully committed to the Fourth Protocol).
94. See id. para. 27 (identifying ten VTO members that will adopt the com-
mitments contained in the Fourth Protocol "in part or at a future date"); '7O Tele-
com Release, supra note 11, para. 8 (reporting that twenty-five governments, about
forty percent of VTO Members, will be phasing in their commitments to the
Fourth Protocol).
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WTO Member have a certain quality of commitment to the Fourth
Protocol but merely requires that the prospective foreign market par-
ticipant be from a WTO Member nation. With this wholesale
change, the FCC believes that it has brought United States law into
conformity with the terms and goals of the Fourth Protocol.
The FCC submits that the Fourth Protocol will help eliminate anti-
competitive conditions that an American basic telecommunications
provider might face.9 8 Also, the FCC hopes the increased competi-
tion resulting from the removal of these barriers, coupled with the
opportunity to participate in a large international market, will ensure
continued compliance with the Fourth Protocol.99 In light of these
95. See 1997 Foreign Entry Order, supra note 9, para. 9 (stating that the open
entry standard applies to all applicants from WTO Member countries without res-
ervation).
96. See 1997 Foreign Entry Order, supra note 9. para. 37 (stating that the FCC
will not consider the quality of commitment to the Fourth Protocol because of the
increased pressure on all WTO Members to open their markets to competition and
that treating individual WTO Members differently would not be appropriate); see
also id. paras. 38-39 (explaining that the benefits of increased competition will en-
courage WTO Members to make greater commitments to the Fourth Protocol). The
FCC proclaims that the United States must lead the way toward an open global
market for basic telecommunications by strictly adhering to the Fourth Protocol
and opening its markets completely to foreign participation. See id. para. 40. In ar-
riving at its conclusion that the ECO test must be dropped, the FCC expressed con-
cern that any sliding scale of ECO review would likely violate the terms of the
Fourth Protocol and could ironically prompt other WTO Member nations to bring
actions against the United States. See id.
97. See 1997 Foreign Entry Order, supra note 9, para. 29 (concluding that it is
no longer appropriate to continue ECO analysis when presented with an application
from a prospective market participant from a WTO Member nation); Harwood et
al., supra note 1, at 886 (noting that the FCC's application of the ECO test is in-
consistent with GATS because it focuses the attention of the FCC on the nationality
of the prospective foreign market participant).
98. See 1997 Foreign Entry Order, supra note 9. para. 33 (concluding that the
open competitive environment created by the Fourth Protocol coupled with the
competitive safeguards outlined in the 1997 Foreign Entry Order adequately pro-
tect against anti-competitive harms); see also Harwood et al., supra note 1, at 884
(concluding that the Fourth Protocol has made substantial progress toward liberal-
izing competition in the basic telecommunications service industry); infra pt.
III.B.2 (analyzing the public interest standard).
99. See 1997 Foreign Entry Order, supra note 9, para. 38 (describing the pre-
dicted effect that increased competition and global opportunity to enter basic tele-
communications markets will cause foreign market participants to pressure their
governments to comply with the Fourth Protocol as quickly as possible); see also
id. para. 39 (arguing that the United States Trade Representative and other WTO
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commitments to competition and competitive effects that result from
implementation of the Fourth Protocol, the FCC concludes that the
ECO test is not necessary for applicants from WTO nations. luo
The FCC also has competitive safeguards""1 in place to eliminate
most of the anti-competitive issues arising from the implementation
of the open entry standard. 1 2 These safeguards are triggered by spe-
cific conduct 10 3 of a foreign market participant occurring after the
Members' trade watchdogs are poised to seek redress for an), perceived violation of
GATS and the Fourth Protocol that may harm competition in the provision of in-
ternational basic telecommunications service).
100. See id. para. 43.
101. See id. para. 34 (listing the competitive safeguard mechanisms that are in
place to combat anti-competitive behavior). The 1997 Foreign Entry Order refines
the "No Special Concessions" safeguard that presumes that a foreign telecommuni-
cations provider with market power in its home market may not form agreements
with an American telecommunications provider involving: provision of basic tele-
communications service, the distribution of customers and allocation of resources
to provide seamless telecommunications service, and the disclosure of information
related to the foreign telecommunications service provider's basic network. See id.
para. 165. It further describes the benchmark rate safeguard that applies to facili-
ties-based telecommunications service providers that have foreign market affiliates.
See id. para. 192. The 1997 Foreign Entry Order summarizes the dominant carrier
safeguards that require a telecommunications provider with market power on a spe-
cific communications route, regardless of whether the carrier is American or for-
eign. See id. para. 222. That carrier must: file tariff filings one day before tariff
changes, structurally separate the foreign affiliate from the domestic carrier, file
quarterly traffic reports with the FCC, file quarterly reports with the FCC regarding
maintenance contracts provided by foreign affiliates, and file quarterly circuit re-
ports with the FCC. See id. para. 222.
102. See id. para. 41 (stating that the competitive safeguards %%ill deter most anti-
competitive conduct).
103. See, e.g., id. para. 145 (expressing the concern that telecommunications
providers with control over foreign input markets can discriminate against unaffili-
ated competitors); id. para. 146 (declining to rely on the antitrust laws to address
typical anti-competitive behavior in the telecommunications market.i The anti-
competitive behavior includes: price discrimination by a monopolist foreign tele-
communications provider against unaffiliated American telecommunications pro-
viders, non-price discrimination by a monopolist foreign telecommunications pro-
vider against unaffiliated American telecommunications providers, and
participation in a price squeeze strategy by which a monopolist foreign telecommu-
nications service provider substantially lowers its prices to affiliated American
telecommunications providers in an attempt to squeeze out other non-affiliated
American telecommunications providers. See id.; cf 1 ABA A.\-rrRUST SECTION,
ANTrrRUST L. DEv. 276-82 (4th ed. 1997) (describing the "essential facilities doc-
trine" that exists in United States antitrust law preventing the restriction of an es-
sential resource by a monopolist denying competitors the opportunity to compete I,
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FCC has approved its application to operate in the United States
market. 0 4 These safeguards, therefore, provide remedial relief
against anti-competitive conduct that would not have happened if the
FCC denied the applicant access to the United States market.
The FCC retained its traditional public interest review to address
allegedly extreme anti-competitive behavior. 10 5 The open entry stan-
dard only creates a strong presumption that the applicant will not en-
gage in anti-competitive conduct. 10 6 The removal of the ECO test in-
vites interested parties to attack this presumption under the FCC's
public interest review. 1
07
2. The Public Interest Standard
Once an applicant has met the open entry standard, the FCC is
statutorily bound to consider whether the application is "consistent
with the public convenience and necessity,"' 0 as well as "consistent
with the public interest."10 9 While this standard appears to be quite
broad,110 the FCC has indicated that the statutory recpuirements will
be applied very narrowly to the foreign entry process.
The FCC analyzes the public interest using two tests. 112 First, the
FCC considers whether the application is consistent with the public
104. See 1997 Foreign Entry Order, supra note 9, para. 34 (noting that the com-
petitive safeguards apply when the foreign market participant has entered the
United States market).
105. See id. para. 46 (reserving the traditional public interest review as a method
of deterring conduct that poses a very high risk to competition); infra pt. IV.B (dis-
cussing transparent regulation).
106. See 1997 Foreign Entry Order, supra note 9, para. 50 (adopting the pre-
sumption that WTO Members have complied with market opening policies for ba-
sic telecommunications service and, therefore, should be allowed open entry into
the United States market).
107. See 1997 Foreign Entry Order, supra note 9, para. 349 (permitting inter-
ested parties the opportunity to file comments regarding pending license applica-
tions before the FCC); 47 C.F.R. § 1.225(a) (1997) (stating that any party can ap-
pear before the FCC).
108. 47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (1994).
109. 47 U.S.C. § 310(b)(4).
110. See 1997 Foreign Entry Order, supra note 9, para. 63 (noting the concerns
about the supposed broad language describing the public interest standard).
111. See id. (predicting that the application of the public interest standard as de-
fined in the order will rarely jeopardize an application).
112. See id. para. 44 (stating that the FCC applies a public interest analysis to a
section 214 or section 310(b)(4) application).
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convenience and necessity. 1 3 Since the FCC concedes that the pre-
sumption that an application does not threaten competition is rebut-
table,114 the FCC reserves the power to attach conditions to the appli-
cation if it decides that the presence of a foreign participant might
threaten competition.115 Furthermore, in exceptional circumstances,
the FCC could deny the application due to the potential harm to
competition. 11
6
The second test considers the effect of the application upon 'na-
tional security, law enforcement, or obligations arising from interna-
tional agreements to which the United States is a party."'1 17 The FCC,
however, expects that if an application presents issues related to this
prong of the public interest analysis, the Executive Branch will raise
113. See id. para. 47 (finding that even though there is a rebuttable presumption
that the entry of WTO Members' basic telecommunication providers serves the
public interest, the FCC must nonetheless consider whether the application presents
such an extraordinary risk to competition that would require the FCC to either im-
pose conditions on the application or deny it).
114. See id. para. 51 (stating that there may be a possibility where a foreign
based carrier from a "WTO Member may pose competitive risks by virtue of the
applicant's ability to exercise market power in a relevant foreign market"). For ex-
ample, a foreign carrier with market power in its home country may team wtith a
United States carrier on more favorable terms than other United States carriers. See
id. Furthermore, a foreign carrier could disrupt service to unaffiliated United States
carriers and thus undermine the international telecommunication services that these
carriers could offer. See id.
The reputation of the applicant is another important FCC consideration. See id.
para. 53. If the FCC believes that the applicant may. on its own. violate the lawrs of
the United States, then the FCC may exercise its right to den) the application. See
id. Of course, the FCC's reputation consideration applies to both domestic appli-
cants and foreign applicants and thus defeats the argument that foreign carriers are
treated differently than American carriers. See id. Similarly, WTO Members are
required to treat all service providers equally regardless of nationality. See GATS,
supra note 20, art. I1, para. 1, annex lB (citing the general principles underlying
WTO Members' agreements for reciprocity regarding trade in services).
115. See 1997 Foreign Entry Order, supra note 9, par. 51 (describing the types
of conditions, including additional reporting requirements, that could be imposed
upon an applicant).
116. See id. para. 52 (describing the type of competitive harm that must be pre-
sented by an application as "the ability to harm competition in the U.S. market in
addition to the ability to exercise [the applicant's] foreign market power"). The
FCC explains that this anti-competitive harm would manifest itself in the form of
an applicant's ability to raise domestic prices by restricting supply. See idL The
FCC predicts, however, that denial of an application by a foreign carrier from a
WTO Member nation would be extremely rare. See id.
117. 1997 Foreign Entry Order, supra note 9, para. 63.
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them.118 Moreover, the FCC has noted that this portion of the public
interest analysis has not changed and has rarely been the grounds for
denial of an application. 119
IV. RECONCILING THE FOURTH PROTOCOL
WITH THE 1997 FOREIGN ENTRY ORDER
A. OPEN MARKETS
Fourth Protocol participants must meet their scheduled commit-
ments, subject to their scheduled exclusions, by the time the Fourth
Protocol comes into force. 12 Participants with exclusions related to
basic telecommunications service do not have to accord MFN treat-
nent to other participants in the excluded sector. 121 Thus, depending
upon the commitments and exclusions, a participant may not have to
completely open its basic telecommunications market to competi-
tion. 
12 2
118. See id. para. 66 (stating that it is the responsibility of the Executive Branch
to raise concerns about "national security, law enforcement, foreign, and foreign
policy" for independent consideration by the FCC); see also 47 C.F.R. pt. 1. 1524
(1997) (permitting any interested party the opportunity to file comments with the
FCC regarding any pending application).
119. See id. para. 64 (noting that the United States Trade Representative has
made comments to the FCC regarding foreign entry applications only on four occa-
sions during the past two years).
120. See Decision on Basic Telecommunications, supra note 30, para. 2 (pro-
hibiting parties to the Fourth Protocol that made schedules of commitments from
enacting or enforcing any legislation or policies in their home countries that is in-
consistent with their commitments); see also Fourth Protocol, supra note 5, para. I
(incorporating the commitments and exceptions made as a result of the Fourth
Protocol into the participants' Schedule of Specific Commitments and List of Arti-
cle II Exemptions to the GATS).
121. See GATS, supra note 20, art. II para. 2 (allowing any WTO Member to
maintain a list of exclusions to MFN treatment that must be annexed to the GATS).
See, e.g., Final U.S. Exemptions, supra note 22 (excluding certain basic telecom-
munications services from the Fourth Protocol and, by extension, excluding these
services from the GATS).
122. See Harwood et al., supra note 1, at 880 (describing the limitations of MFN
resulting from the services excluded under GATS Article II). But cf General
Agreement on Trade in Services, Dec. 15, 1993, Annex on Article 11 Exceptions.
33 I.L.M. 44, 68-69 (stating that exceptions to the GATS should not last longer
than ten years).
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The 1997 Foreign Entry Order effectively opens the United States
market for basic telecommunications service to any WTO Mem-
ber. 23 In fact, the 1997 Foreign Entry Order actually provides more
market access than is called for in the Fourth Protocol.' 24 Any WTO
Member has open access to the United States market,'25 and a WTO
Member will only be denied access when significant anti-competitive
harm will result in the United States market for international tele-
communications services.1 26 Regardless, every WTO Member will
enjoy the 1997 Foreign Entry Order's open market entry standard.
The 1997 Foreign Entry Order complies with the market-opening
purposes of the Fourth Protocol. According to the FCC, only in rare
circumstances will the FCC deny an application from a foreign basic
telecommunications provider from a WTO Member.'27 The FCC will
likely approve the application of a WTO Member that is a Fourth
Protocol participant in nearly all situations.!28 Therefore, the 1997
Foreign Entry Order has effectively opened the United States market.
B. TRANSPARENT REGULATION
The Fourth Protocol also calls for transparent regulation by an in-
dependent body in each WTO Member nation that is also a Fourth
Protocol participant. 129 This requirement, which the Reference Paper
suggests, calls for a WTO Member to publicize the standards by
123. See supra notes 89-100 and accompanying text tanalyzing the market-
opening effects of the 1997 Foreign Entry Order).
124. Compare supra note 88 (describing the entities to whom the FCC will apply
its regulations under the 1997 Foreign Entry Order) with supra notes 93-94 and ac-
companying text (describing the varying degrees of participation in the Fourth
Protocol because WTO Members have filed exceptions to MFN) aind supra notes
26-28 (describing the inherent limitations of the MFN mechanism).
125. See supra note 96 (describing the 1997 Foreign Entry Order's regulations
that apply the open market standard to any WTO Member).
126. See supra note 114 (discussing the circumstances whereby a WTO Member
may be denied access).
127. See id.
128. See 1997 Foreign Entry Order. supra note 9. para. 52 (predicting that only
under the rarest of circumstances will a participant in the Fourth Protocol be denied
access to the United States market), FCC Eases Carriers' Access to U.S. ,Market.
TR INT'L, Dec. 5, 1997, available in 1997 WL 12641621 (reporting FCC officials'
comments that it would be "extremely rare" for a WTO Member to have its appli-
cation denied).
129. See Reference Paper, supra note 37, at 366-69.
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which it will regulate foreign participation in its basic telecommuni-
cations market. 130 These standards must be readily interpreted by
prospective market participants.' 31
The 1997 Foreign Entry Order meets this requirement by stating
exactly to whom the new open entry standard applies. 132 Also, the
1997 Foreign Entry Order narrowly defines the remaining statutory
obligation of the FCC to review the application's effect on the public
interest. 133 This public interest review is permitted by the Fourth
Protocol and the GATS. t34
The Fourth Protocol requires that regulatory review of licensing of
foreign telecommunications providers occur within a reasonable
amount of time. 35 Indeed, the FCC specified time periods for the re-
view of applications in its 1997 Foreign Entry Order. 136 These time
periods are substantially shorter than those previously used under the
ECO analysis.' 
37
130. See id. at 368.
131. See id. at 368-69 (describing the requirement of the independent regulatory
body to provide public license criteria).
132. See FCC Eases Carriers'Access to U.S. Market, supra note 128 (listing the
applications to which the 1997 Foreign Order Applies as applications for authori-
zation to provide facilities-based and resold services by a foreign telecommunica-
tions carrier, applications to exceed the 25% indirect foreign ownership threshold,
and applications for undersea cable landing licenses); see also 1997 Foreign Entry
Order, supra note 9, para. 2; cf Schmidt, supra note 9, at 630-31 (describing to
whom the 1995 Foreign Entry Order applied and the type of applications that trig-
ger the application of the ECO test).
133. See supra pt. III.B.2 (detailing the public interest analysis set forth by the
1997 Foreign Entry Order).
134. See Decision on Basic Telecommunications, supra note 30, para. 2 (stating
that the implementation of the commitments and exclusions by the WTO Members
that have participated in the Fourth Protocol must be "consistent with their existing
legislation and regulations").
135. See Reference Paper, supra note 37, at 369 (stating that the suggested
regulatory body should publicize the amount of time that is "normally required" to
complete its review of a license application).
136. See 1997 Foreign Entry Order, supra note 9, para. 327 (stating that the
streamlined process the vast majority of applications will enjoy under the 1997
Foreign Entry Order will take thirty-five days from the time the FCC places the ap-
plication on its docket); see also id. para. 328 (stating that applications not quali-
fying for the streamlined process will receive renewable ninety-day time periods
under which the FCC can complete its review).
137. Compare id. para. 327 (creating a thirty-five day review period for stream-
lined applications), with id. para. 35 (noting that removal of the ECO test will save
substantial time and money).
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V. EVALUATION OF EUROPEAN UNION CLAIMS
The European Union has expressed concerns regarding the 1997
Foreign Entry Order and has threatened action before the WTO. 38
The European Union complains that the public interest analysis of
the FCC is not well-defined 3 9 and that the 1997 Foreign Entry Order
assumes that special competitive safeguards are necessary for United
States companies affiliated with foreign telecommunications carriers
that have market power.140 The European Union could pursue action
with the WTO, as it has indicated, 14 or appeal the 1997 Foreign En-
try Order through an action before the United States Courts of Ap-
peals.
142
138. See EU Release, supra note 18 (expressing the European Union's concern
that the FCC's Notice on Proposed Rule-Making on Foreign Participation in the
United States Telecommunications Market violates WTO obligations).
139. See id. (citing such vague public interest factors as -law enforcement" and
"foreign policy"); see also supra pt. III.B.2 (describing the remaining public inter-
est review the FCC will perform under the 1997 Foreign Entry Order).
140. See id.; see also notes 101-04 and accompanying text (describing the com-
petitive safeguards that remain at the FCC's disposal to address anti-competitive
harm).
141. See id.; Frances Williams, Date Agreed for Telecoms Pact, FIN. TLwES, Jan.
27, 1998, at 7 (stating that the European Union continues to warn that it may issue
a challenge in the WTO regarding the United States' alleged non-fulfillment of its
commitments to the Fourth Protocol); Jeffrey Silva. W1TO Accord Could Hit Snags:
FCC, EU Spar Over Free Trade, RCR RADIO CoMM. REP., Dec. 8, 1997, available
in 1997 WL 16672232 (reporting that European Union spokesman Nigel Gardiner
has said that the European Union retains the right to seek redress through the WTO
for alleged problems with the 1997 Foreign Entry Order); FCC Eases Carriers'
Access to U.S. Market, supra note 128 (describing the continuing European Union
concerns with the 1997 Foreign Entry Order despite the FCC's modifications of the
order in response to the concerns expressed by the European Union).
142. See 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1994) (permitting the appeal of any order by the
FCC); 47 U.S.C. § 405(a) (permitting an appeal of an order by a party in an FCC
rulemaking action regardless of whether the party pursues a reconsideration of the
order by the FCC); 47 U.S.C. § 2342 (granting any court of appeals, except for the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the power to "enjoin, set
aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or to determine the validity of... all final or-
ders of the Federal Communications Commission").
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A. POTENTIAL EUROPEAN UNION ACTION BEFORE THE WTO
To initiate a claim under the enforcement mechanisms of the
WTO, 143 the European Union must first allege a justiciable claim un-
der the GATS. 144 Causes of action under the GATS include either
violations 145 or non-violations. 46 Since the 1997 Foreign Entry Or-
der directly addresses the Fourth Protocol, which is part of the
GATS, the European Union must allege a violation cause of action to
attack the retention of public interest review by the FCC. 147 The fol-
lowing section will analyze a potential action by the European Union
arising from the enactment of the 1997 Foreign Entry Order and then
143. See GATS, supra note 20, arts. XXII & XXIII (describing the GATS en-
forcement mechanisms that consist of consultations between WTO Members and
dispute settlement bodies ("DSB") that resolve conflicts that are not satisfactorily
addressed in consultations).
144. See GATS, supra note 20, art. I (stating that the GATS applies to measures
by a WTO Member that affect trade in services); cf WTO Appellate Body Report
on European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, para. 220 (Sept. 9, 1997), available in 1997 WL
577784 [hereinafter WTO Banana Appeal] (analyzing the language of the GATS to
determine the scope of justiciable claims under the GATS).
145. See GATS, supra note 20, art. XXIII, para. I (stating that any Member can
seek consultations regarding any other Member that has allegedly failed to honor
its obligations under the GATS); Peter K. Morrison, WVTO Dispute Settlement in
Sen'ices: Procedural and Substantive Aspects, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
AND THE GATT/WTO DISPu-E SETTLEMENT SYsTEM 377, 380-81 (Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann ed., 1997) (describing a violation case as one where a party to the
GATS fails to fulfill an obligation under the GATS); cf First Submission of the
United States of America re European Communities-Regime for the Importation,
Sale and Distribution of Bananas, paras. 199-211 (July 9, 1996), available in 1996
WL 397092 [hereinafter United States Banana Complaint] (alleging that the Euro-
pean Union has not met its MFN obligation under Article II of the GATS and
therefore has violated the GATS).
146. See GATS, supra note 20, art. XXIII, para. 3 (stating that a WTO Member
may seek consultations regarding "any benefit that it could reasonably have ex-
pected to accrue to it under a specific commitment of another Member") (emphasis
added); Morrison, supra note 145, at 381 (describing a non-violation case as one
that involves conduct by a Member that does not directly violate the terms of the
GATS or an agreement to it but rather affects the Member's commitments to the
GATS).
147. See GATS, supra note 20, art. XXIII para. I (stating that if any WTO
Member does not satisfy its commitments that are annexed to the GATS, any other
member may seek consultations); Morrison, supra note 145, at 381 (describing the
relaxed standard of a violation under the GATS as opposed to the GATT); see also
WTO Banana Appeal, supra note 144, para. 220 (interpreting the GATS as apply-
ing to any measure that affects trade services in any way).
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hypothesize a future scenario that may cause the European Union to
seek redress through the WTO.
1. Potential Action Based on Enactment of the 1997 Foreign Entry
Order
The European Union must claim that the 1997 Foreign Entry Or-
der denies it a benefit it is entitled to under the GATS. 48 First, the
European Union contends that the public interest review standard is
vague and overly broad.' 49 As discussed above, instead of automati-
cally approving applications by foreign telecommunications provid-
ers from WTO Member nations, under the 1997 Foreign Entry Order
the FCC has reserved the right to evaluate (1) whether the prospec-
tive applicant poses a threat to "national security, law enforcement,
or obligations arising from international agreements to which the
United States is a party"'150 and (2) whether the applicant poses ex-
traordinary anti-competitive hazards if allowed to enter the United
States market. 15' This public interest review could potentially result
in denial of an application by a telecommunications provider from a
WTO Member nation.152 The European Union would characterize the
rejection of an application as a denial of a benefit and, hence, a vio-
lation of the GATS.
The reservation of power to deny applications does not violate the
GATS. 153 The European Union asserts, however, that the ambiguous
148. See supra notes 145 & 147 and accompanying text (describing the causes
of action under the GATS resulting from a WTO Member failing to fulfill specific
commitments to the GATS); cf. United States Banana Complaint, supra note 145,
para. 212 (concluding that the infringement of the obligations under the GATS (or
any covered agreement under the GATS) is considered a prima facie case in which
a violation of the GATS has occurred).
149. See EU Release, supra note 18 (urging the United States to change its tele-
communications regulations).
150. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text (describing the public inter-
est concerns regarding national security that the FCC will continue to evaluate un-
der the 1997 Foreign Entry Order).
151. See supra notes 113-14 (describing the type of anti-competitive harm
against which the FCC would guard).
152. See supra note 108-19 and accompanying text (discussing the public inter-
est review).
153. See Decision on Basic Telecommunications. supra note 30, para. 2 (stating
that each WTO Member participating in the Fourth Protocol must change its do-
mestic regulations to conform with the market opening commitments for the basic
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standards applied in determining denial, violate the GATS. 154 If the
European Union complaint is deemed valid, then it would show that
the United States has not lived up to its commitment to provide defi-
nite standards used to evaluate telecommunications applications for
entry into its market. 155 Accordingly, under GATS law, 15 6 the Euro-
pean Union could seek consultations regarding any denial of benefits
under the GATS. 1
57
The European Union has also complained that the 1997 Foreign
Entry Order makes an unnecessary assumption.'58 The FCC assumed
that safeguards are necessary to address potential anti-competitive
conduct that a foreign telecommunications provider with market
power in its home country might engage in with its affiliates in the
United States. 159 The safeguards empower the FCC to require a
dominant foreign telecommunications provider to offer reasonable
access to its network to all United States telecommunications provid-
telecommunications service); 1997 Foreign Entry Order, supra note 9, para. 12
(suggesting that the FCC has taken important steps toward fulfilling the United
States commitments to the Fourth Protocol with the adoption of the 1997 Foreign
Entry Order).
154. See GATS, supra note 20, art. VI, para. 4 (noting that a WTO Member may
have a regulatory body evaluate the qualifications of an applicant for a license to
provide services, but that the standards for review must be objective and transpar-
ent); Reference Paper, supra note 37 (stating that the independent regulatory body
that reviews basic telecommunications license applications must promulgate identi-
fiable standards for review).
155. See Final United States Commitments, supra note 22 (accepting the obliga-
tions contained in the Reference Paper, which states that the United States will
adopt transparent regulations of telecommunications providers as part of the United
States commitments to the GATS).
156. See Morrison, supra note 145, at 377-78 (recognizing that there is a paucity
of decisions by the WTO resolving disputes by WTO Members regarding any
service industry due to the relative youth of the WTO and the GATS).
157. See GATS, supra note 20, art. XXIII, para. I (stating that any WTO Mem-
ber may have recourse to address any alleged violation of the GATS that results
from another WTO Member failing to fulfill its commitments).
158. See EU Release, supra note 18.
159. See 1997 Foreign Entry Order, supra note 9, paras. 144-47 (explaining in
great detail the FCC's concerns about foreign monopolists using their market
power to harm the United States international telecommunications market and con-
cluding that special safeguards are necessary to monitor foreign telecommunica-
tions providers that have market power in their home market and United States af-
filiated carriers).
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ers on similar terms and to make extensive reports to the FCC. 6 "
This regulatory burden could be seen as a non-tariff barrier that re-
duces the access of dominant foreign telecommunications providers
to the United States market.'
61
The European Union might allege that the safeguards placed upon
dominant foreign telecommunications providers violate the United
States' commitment to the GATS.162 Since most foreign telecommu-
nications providers are monopolies or have market power,' 63 the
safeguards contained in the 1997 Foreign Entry Order could apply to
nearly all potential foreign participants in the United States market.
Since the United States has committed to open its market in the
Fourth Protocol, the application of the safeguards contained in the
1997 Foreign Entry Order arguably could nullify the benefit of open
markets for which WTO Members bargained. Such nullification
would be a justiciable cause of action under the GATS and, as a re-
sult, the European Union could seek consultations through the
WTO.
164
2. Potential European Union WTO Action Taken at a Future Date
In addition to the claims resulting from the enactment of the 1997
Foreign Entry Order, the European Union could wait until several of
European Union based telecommunications providers file applica-
tions with the FCC. If the FCC routinely denies or conditions foreign
entry into the United States basic telecommunications market in ap-
plying the 1997 Foreign Entry Order, the European Union may have
160. See id. paras. 225-26 (requiring the United States affiliates of foreign tele-
communications providers to file numerous reports with the FCC).
161. See GATS, supra note 20, art. VI, para. 4 (stating that when granting li-
censes for participation in a service sector, a WTO Member may not erect barriers
to license acquisitions that are "not more burdensome than necessary").
162. See Decision on Basic Telecounmunications, supra note 30, para. 2 (de-
scribing the Fourth Protocol's provision that prevents a party from enacting any
legislation that conflicts with the participant's commitments).
163. See supra note 1 (describing the economic pressures that lead to monopo-
lies in the basic telecommunications sector).
164. See Morrison, supra note 145, at 381-82 (stating that a GATS claim could
result from the improper application of a measure designed to comply with com-
mitments to the GATS); United States Banana Complaint. supra note 145, para.
212.
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substantial evidence the United States has not fulfilled its commit-
ments to the Fourth Protocol.
65
The Fourth Protocol calls for each participant to refrain from en-
acting any legislation that would hinder the participant's commit-
ments. 166 The United States committed to open its basic telecommu-
nications market completely to foreign participation, with only one
exception. 167 The 1997 Foreign Entry Order is designed to accom-
plish these commitments. 16 8 If, in practice, the FCC routinely denies
or conditions applications by foreign telecommunications provid-
ers, 169 the 1997 Foreign Entry Order would have the effect of closing
the United States market.1 70 The European Union could thus seek
165. Cf United States Banana Complaint, supra note 145, paras. 143-51 (com-
paring the opportunities to enter the European Union banana market before and af-
ter the European Union's enactment of a regulatory regime affecting licensing for
banana imports). The new regulatory regime violated Articles II and XVII of the
GATS. See WTO Banana Appeal, supra note 144, para. 255 (affirming the DSB
finding that the European Union's regulatory scheme governing the importation of
bananas violated the GATS).
166. See Decision on Basic Telecommunications, supra note 30, para. 2.
167. See supra note 22 (discussing the exceptions to the Fourth Protocol made
by the United States).
168. See 1997 Foreign Entry Order, supra note 9, para. 12 (stating that the 1997
Foreign Entry Order is a significant step toward fulfilling the commitments to the
Fourth Protocol).
169. Cf In re Application by BellSouth Corp. Pursuant to Section 271 of the
Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, to Provide In-Region, InterLATA
Services in Louisiana, No. 97-231, 1998 WL 42491, para. I (F.C.C. Feb. 3, 1998)
(denying application by basic telecommunications provider to provide long dis-
tance telephone service because the provider failed to satisfy statutory requirements
to provide competitors non-discriminatory access to operations support systems
and offer access to its network at fair prices); In re Application of BellSouth Corp.
Pursuant to Section 271 of the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, to Pro-
vide In-Region, InterLATA Services in South Carolina, No. 97-208, 1997 WL
799081 (F.C.C. Dec. 24, 1997) (denying application by basic telecommunications
service provider to provide long distance phone service because provider did not
satisfy competitive checklist that determines whether provider has adequately
opened its market to competitors); In re Application of Ameritech Michigan Pursu-
ant to Section 271 of the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, to Provide In-
Region, InterLATA Services in Michigan, 9 Communications Reg. (P&F) 267. 267
para. 5 (F.C.C. 1997) (denying Section 271 application by local Bell Operating
Company to provide long distance telephone service, as permitted by the 1996
Telecommunications Act, because Ameritech did not adequately satisfy the corn-
petitive checklist contained in the Act).
170. See Oliver, supra note 20, at 18 (concluding that if the FCC conditions for-
eign entry applications after applying the 1997 Foreign Entry Order, the prospec-
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consultations through the WTO because the United States would
have violated its commitments to open its market in basic telecom-
munications. 
171
While claims under the GATS would be essentially the same re-
gardless of whether the European Union seeks consultations now or
later, the European Union will have a stronger claim for remedial ac-
tion by the WTO if the FCC demonstrates that it will not grant appli-
cations of prospective foreign market participants without conditions.
As described in the previous section, the FCC thoroughly explained
the standards by which it will perform the public interest analysis. 
72
Additionally, the FCC has clearly demonstrated a long tradition of
applying safeguards to both domestic and foreign telecommunica-
tions providers that have market power in their respective markets. 17
3
Because the 1997 Foreign Entry Order does not on its face contradict
the commitments of the United States to the Fourth Protocol, it
would appear that the European Union could not succeed on a GATS
claim unless the FCC routinely denies or conditions applications by
foreign telecommunications providers.
tive foreign applicant will accuse the FCC of xenophobia or nationalistic protec-
tionism).
171. See GATS, supra note 20, art. XXIII (stating that no WTO Member may
deny a benefit that another Member expects under the GATS by utilizing a measure
consistent with the GATS); Decision on Basic Teleconmntunications, supra note 30,
para. 2 (concluding that no party to the Fourth Protocol shall enact an) legislation
inconsistent with the market opening commitments resulting from the negotiations
leading up to the Fourth Protocol). But see GATS. supra note 20. art. 11. para. I
(stating that a WTO Member is only required to accord the same treatment to a for-
eign service provider as it provides to an), other service provider); 47 U.S.C.A. §
271(c)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1997) (itemizing a list of interconnection requirements
for dominant American providers of basic telecommunications services who seek
to offer long distance service in regions of the United States %%,here the law previ-
ously excluded them from operation): Oliver. stqpra note 20. at 18 (noting that
dominant American telecommunications services are extensively regulated by the
FCC under the 1996 Telecommunications Act and opining that a complaint by
dominant foreign telecommunications providers to the \WT'O regarding denial of
MFN treatment would likely fail because of this extensive domestic regulation).
172. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text (describing the FCC's ex-
planation for applying the public interest standard in the 1997 Foreign Entry Or-
der).
173. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text (detailing the FCC's com-
petitive safeguards).
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B. POTENTIAL EUROPEAN UNION ACTION BEFORE A UNITED
STATES CIRCUIT COURT
For purposes of this comment, it is assumed that the European
Union has standing to seek judicial review of the 1997 Foreign Entry
Order at the federal circuit court level. 174 The European Union's
complaints-that the 1997 Foreign Entry Order inadequately defines
the public interest review performed by the FCC and unnecessarily
assumes that safeguards are required for dominant carrier regula-
tion-would be reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard.175 This standard requires that the FCC adequately consider the
174. See 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1994) (permitting the appeal of any order by the
FCC); 47 U.S.C. § 405(a) (permitting an appeal of an order by a party in an FCC
rulemaking action regardless of whether the party pursues a reconsideration of the
order by the FCC); 47 U.S.C. § 2342 (granting any court of appeals, except for the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the power to "enjoin, set
aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or to determine the validity of... all final or-
ders of the Federal Communications Commission"); 1997 Foreign Entry Order, su-
pra note 9, App. A (listing the European Union as a participant in the proceeding);
see also Competitive Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC, 75 F.3d 1350, 1361 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding that a state public utility commission has standing to challenge an FCC
rule that infringes upon its sovereign powers to "create[] and enforce[] fair and ef-
fective public utility regulation."). But see Omnipoint Corp. v. FCC, 78 F.3d 620,
628 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 23 F.3d
496, 498 (D.C. Cir. 1994)) (holding that a party must "show injury in fact that is
fairly traceable to the defendant's action and is redressable by the relief requested"
to have standing to appeal a FCC ruling); DIRECT TV, Inc. v. FCC, 110 F.3d 816,
828 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
175. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994) (directing circuit courts to hold unlawful
any agency action that is arbitrary or capricious); Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 52 1,
528 (1990) (holding that when reviewing an agency rulemaking, courts should ap-
ply the arbitrary and capricious standard); Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n of
the United States v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-43 (1983)
(holding that an agency rule is evaluated by an arbitrary and capricious standard);
see also ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WLLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §
13.10 (1993) (describing the arbitrary and capricious standard of review for agency
rulemaking orders). The European Union does not appear to challenge the FCC's
jurisdiction to impose the 1997 Foreign Entry Order, just the definitions of certain
terms and application of assumptions. See EU Release, supra note 18 (identifying
the use of "a broad and unclear concept of 'very high risk to competition' as a justi-
fication for refusing a license" as a primary concern); cf 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (di-
recting the circuit court to hold unlawful any agency action that exceeds the
agency's jurisdiction).
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issues presented to it, but does not require that the FCC arrive at the
correct decision. 1
76
In response, the European Union would have to argue that the FCC
did not adequately analyze the issues before it during the 1997 For-
eign Entry Order proceeding. 177 The FCC, however, did perform an
extensive analysis of the issues raised by the European Union. 17" The
FCC painstakingly reviewed all of the comments submitted by the
European Union and other interested parties regarding the remaining
public interest standard, and concluded that United States law did not
permit the FCC to abandon its public interest review. 1 79 Additionally,
the FCC thoroughly reviewed the safeguards, addressing potential
anti-competitive conduct that could be perpetrated by dominant for-
eign market carriers.'
80
The European Union should not seek judicial review of the 1997
Foreign Entry Order. The FCC has performed an extensive analysis
of the two main issues that the European Union raises, and thus a cir-
176. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (holding that an agency must review rele-
vant information presented to it and present a thoughtful rule that is clearly not an
error in judgment); Atlantic Tele-Network, Inc. v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1384, 1388-89
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that the FCC must analyze the issues presented in its or-
der granting an application for international telecommunications service and that
the circuit court will not substitute its judgment for the FCC's): accord Freeman
Engineering Assoc., Inc. v. FCC, 103 F.3d 169. 272 (D.C. Cir. 1997); SBC Com-
munications Inc. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 1484, 1490 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
177. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (holding that an administrative agency acts
arbitrarily and capriciously when it fails to adequately consider issues raised before
it or completely ignores the record when making its decision); accord Competitive
Telecommn. Ass'n, 75 F.3d at 1358; Atlantic Tele-Nenvork, 59 F.3d at 1388-89.
178. See 1997 Foreign Entry Order, supra note 9, paras. 59-66, 87-96, 246-92
(analyzing the remaining public interest review in the 1997 Foreign Entry Order
and the need for special safeguards for dominant foreign telecommunications carri-
ers); cf. Competitive Teleconun. Ass'n, 75 F.3d at 1358-61 (reviewing the analysis
performed by the FCC in a proceeding to establish rules regarding caller identifi-
cation services and concluding that the analysis was sufficient to satisfy the arbi-
trary and capricious standard).
179. See supra pt. III.B.2 (describing the use and application of the ECO test in
FCC determinations as to the existence of competitive opportunities for American
providers in foreign markets).
180. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text (outlining the operation of
FCC competitive safeguard mechanisms).
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cuit court is likely to conclude that the FCC's determinations are
neither arbitrary nor capricious.
181
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS & CONCLUSION
The FCC should implement its 1997 Foreign Entry Order as soon
as it possibly can. 182 By leading the way toward implementing the
Fourth Protocol, 183 the United States can put substantial pressure on
other Fourth Protocol participants. 184 Such action will lead to faster
international deregulation of the basic telecommunications market.
The European Union should not pursue remedies available to it
through the WTO. The European Union is primarily upset with the
1997 Foreign Entry Order because, according to the European Union,
the FCC has not adequately defined its public interest review.185 In
181. See Competitive Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC, 75 F.3d 1350, 1358-59 (9th Cir.
1996) (finding that the FCC properly applied its rules after rationally considering
the record before it, and that the FCC is permitted to make reasonable assumptions
about the economics of its rules or decisions); Atlantic Tele-Network, Inc. v. FCC,
59 F.3d 1384, 1390-91 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that the FCC need not consider
every issue raised in a proceeding but must evaluate the effect a proceeding has
upon the public interest in such a manner that the court can discern the FCC's ra-
tionale); supra pt. III.B (describing the entire rulemaking process that the FCC en-
gaged in to arrive at its 1997 Foreign Entry Order).
182. See Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecommunications Market, supra
note 13 (stating that the 1997 Foreign Entry Order was effective on February 9,
1998).
183. See Heather Fleming, Speed-Dialing Cfor Competition. RECORD (Northern
N.J.). Nov. 26, 1997, at B I (stating that the United States is the first WTO Member
to change its law in compliance with the Fourth Protocol).
184. See Experts See European Market Opening More Slowly Than U.S.,
COMM. DAILY, June 3. 1997, at 4-5 (reporting that the United States Trade Repre-
sentative is preparing to initiate a precedent setting action with the WTO to force
WTO Members to comply with their commitments to the Fourth Protocol). But see
Irwin Stelzer, Growing Trade Gap Stirs Protectionists, SUN. TIMES (London),
March 23, 1997, at C3 (describing concerns by conservative congressional officials
that the WTO, through its enforcement mechanisms, could have influence on the
regulations promulgated by the United States).
185. See Jeffrey Silva, WTO Accord Could Hit Snags: FCC, EU Spar Over Free
Trade, RCR RADIO COMM. REP., Dec. 8, 1997, available in 1997 WL 16672232
(highlighting the European Union's disdain for the FCC's public interest defini-
tion); FCC's WTO hnplementation Gathers Steam-And Some Criticism, COMM.
DAILY, Aug. 8, 1997, at I (describing the points of contention that the European
Union has with the 1997 Foreign Entry Order).
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particular, the European Union alleges that the public interest stan-
dard by which the FCC could deny an application is too broad.1
6
Since the release of the 1997 Foreign Entry Order, the European
Union has softened its position by apparently taking time to assess
the implementation of the 1997 Foreign Entry Order. IS7 Although the
European Union may not want to rule out future WTO action re-
garding the 1997 Foreign Entry Order, it should at least wait until the
FCC has had an opportunity to review applications under the new
rules. 188 Such a grace period is necessary to encourage basic tele-
communications providers to seek the benefits of the 1997 Foreign
Entry Order.' 
89
The Fourth Protocol is the culmination of extensive negotiation to
break down the competitive barriers hindering the provision of inter-
national telecommunication service. With the expected cost reduc-
tions, enhanced service, and increased telecommunications access
that are predicted to result from the Fourth Protocol, more people
across the globe will be able to communicate with one another via
the telephone. The FCC appreciates the benefits of this global tele-
communications market and has made a remarkable effort to ensure
its occurrence. Other WTO Members should follow suit quickly so
that the Fourth Protocol will have its intended effects.
186. See FCC Adopts Rules for Easier Access to U.S. Market, supra note Is t de-
scribing the Europeans' concerns that the public interest standard is so murk), that
it would allow the FCC to deny or condition nearly any application).
187. See id. (stating that the European Union will take time to study the 1997
Foreign Entry Order to determine whether their concerns have been addressed);
Fleming, supra note 183, at BI (citing a European Union official as saying that a
WTO proceeding against the United States will be initiated if there is "active dis-
crimination against European firms").
188. See FCC Eases Carrier's Access to U.S. Market, supra note 128 (reporting
that industry sources are prepared to let the FCC apply its rules and see if the) are
applied as promised in the 1997 Foreign Entry Order).
189. See id. (citing industry officials as optimistic that if the European Union ex-
periences the benefits promised by the 1997 Foreign Entry Order. the European
Union may relax and refrain from pursuing WTO remedies).
